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Abstract 
State-by-State Abolition of  
Juvenile Life without Parole Sentences in the United States  
since Miller v. Alabama (2012) 
Amy Gina Kim 
Since Miller v. Alabama (2012), 18 states and the District of Columbia abolished juvenile 
life without parole sentences. This thesis examines the arguments, norms, logic, and messages 
utilized at each state since Miller to support the elimination of juvenile life without parole 
sentences. The arguments either stem from the nature of children or the nature of the sentence 
itself. Scientific studies that confirm the distinctive psychological attributes of youth has been 
adduced to argue for the diminished culpability of children, the inability of the sentence to serve 
its penological goals, children’s capacity of change, and the fallacy of the predictive enterprise to 
determine the incorrigibility of a juvenile offender. The harshness of the sentence itself, domestic 
and foreign practice, the prohibition of the sentence under international human rights law, the fiscal 
and behavioral benefits of offering the possibility of parole, and the racial disparities of the 
sentence have also been argued at the state-level. The effectiveness of the arguments above may 
be enhanced when they are delivered by formerly incarcerated youth or victims of violence or 
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Today, the United States is the only country in the world that sentences life incarceration 
without the possibility of parole to juvenile offenders who have committed crimes before the age 
of 18. The U.S. is a pariah in a world that reached a consensus through international human rights 
treaties such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, specifically prohibiting countries from 
imposing life without parole sentences to juvenile offenders. Although the U.S. Supreme Court 
banned the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons in 2005, juvenile offenders can still be 
sentenced to die in prison despite subsequent efforts to bar juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) 
sentences.1 In 2010, Graham v. Florida banned the sentencing of life without parole for juveniles 
convicted of non-homicide crimes.2 Two years later, the Supreme Court’s joint decision of Miller 
v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs held that mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles 
convicted of homicide related crimes are unconstitutional.3 However, Miller did not constitute a 
categorical bar on juvenile life without parole sentences, merely banning the mandatory sentencing 
of it. In other words, a juvenile convicted of a homicide offence can still “be sentenced to life 
without parole if the sentencing scheme follows certain processes, including considering the youth 
and individual characteristics of the offender.”4 In 2016, the Supreme Court ruled in Montgomery 
v. Louisiana that the decision in Miller applied retroactively, meaning that inmates serving 
                                           
1 Roper v. Simmons, No. 543 U.S. 551 (Supreme Court of the United States March 1, 2005). 
2 Graham v. Florida, No. 560 U.S. 48 (Supreme Court of the United States May 17, 2010). 
3 Miller v. Alabama, No. 567 U.S. 460 (Supreme Court of the United States June 25, 2012). 
4 Martha F. Davis, Johanna Kalb, and Risa Kaufman, Human Rights Advocacy in the United States (St. Paul, MN: 
West Academic Publishing, 2014), 52. 
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mandatory life without parole sentences for crimes they committed as a juvenile before Miller are 
also entitled to the possibility of parole or resentencing.5 
While federal courts have left life without parole as a sentencing option for juveniles, a 
rapidly growing number of states have abolished the sentence. Since the Supreme Court’s Miller 
decision in 2012, an additional 18 states and the District of Columbia have prohibited JLWOP 
sentences either through state supreme court holdings or state legislation: adding up to a total of 
21 states and the District of Columbia.6 Four states, including Maine, New Mexico, New York, 
and Rhode Island, do not have any inmates serving life without parole for crimes they have 
committed as a juvenile.7  
Despite the limitations of the Supreme Court’s holding in Miller v. Alabama, states are 
rapidly abandoning juvenile life without parole. The growing number of states as well as the 
consistency in the direction of change warrant an examination on how each of the states have 
succeeded in abolishing the sentence.  
2. Objective 
This research project seeks to examine what arguments, human rights norms, logic, and 
messages have been utilized by actors in the 18 states and the District of Columbia that have 
eliminated juvenile life without parole sentences since Miller v. Alabama (2012). This research 
will also attempt to answer the following questions: How did each state abolish juvenile life 
                                           
5 Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 577 U.S. 460 (Supreme Court of the United States January 25, 2016). 
6 “Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview” (The Sentencing Project, October 22, 2018), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without-parole/. 
7 Matt Gritzmacher, “Does Your State Still Use Life-without-Parole Sentences for Kids?,” Campaign for the Fair 




without parole since 2012, through litigation or legislation? What arguments, norms, logic, 
messages were utilized at each state? What arguments were made most frequently? What factors 
may have affected the efficacy of certain arguments? Do the arguments, norms, logic, messages 
made at the state level refer to those made in Miller v. Alabama? Finally, the question that is of 
most interest is whether states have highlighted the prohibition of the sentence under international 
human rights law. Do state supreme court decisions cite international human rights law that 
prohibit juvenile life without parole? Do state legislators and other actors refer to international 
human rights law as evidence to support abolishing the sentence? 
3. Significance 
The United States is the only country in the world to impose life without parole sentences 
to juvenile offenders.8 Previous Supreme Court decisions have failed to categorically bar the 
sentence. The Supreme Court recently denied to hear a case arguing the unconstitutionality of the 
sentence in November 2017.9 The hurdles federal-level litigation are facing suggest that advocates 
should reassess the arguments made to eliminate the sentence and examine the value of state-by-
state abolition. 
Therefore, rather than analyzing federal-level litigation, this research will focus on state-
level efforts as “a vast majority of child offenders sentenced to life without parole were sentenced 
under state rather than federal laws.”10 In addition, although the expansion of higher court policies 
does not occur often, since the Supreme Court’s decision on Miller in 2012, an additional 18 states 
                                           
8 Davis, Kalb, and Kaufman, Human Rights Advocacy in the United States, 53; Jo Becker, Campaigning for Justice : 
Human Rights Advocacy in Practice (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013), 222. 
9 “Justice at Last for the Youngest Inmates?,” The New York Times, January 20, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/opinion/life-sentence-youth-parole.html. 
10 Becker, Campaigning for Justice, 223. 
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and the District of Columbia have categorically prohibited JLWOP sentences either through state 
supreme court holdings or state legislation: constituting a vast majority of the 21 states and the 
District of Columbia that have barred the sentence.11 Documentation of change at the state level 
since Miller has focused on the end results rather than the process and specific arguments utilized 
to bring about such change.12 The few scholarly works that have examined the dynamic efforts at 
the state-level to end JLWOP had focused on California, prior to the Miller decision in 2012.13 
Therefore, this paper’s update on the new developments at the state-level and its focus on 
arguments made at the state-level since Miller will contribute to understanding how and why states 
have expanded the decision of Miller and provide a deeper analysis on the process of change and 
the effectiveness of certain advocacy efforts.  
                                           
11 Bradley C. Canon, Judicial Policies : Implementation and Impact (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1999), 44; “A 
State-by-State Look at Juvenile Life without Parole,” The Seattle Times, July 30, 2017, 
https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/a-state-by-state-look-at-juvenile-life-without-parole/. 
12 John R. Mills, Anna M. Dorn, and Amelia Courtney Hritz, “Juvenile Life without Parole in Law and Practice: 
Chronicling the Rapid Change Underway,” American University Law Review 65 (2016): 535; “A State-by-State 
Look at Juvenile Life without Parole”; “Juvenile Life Without Parole After Miller v. Alabama” (The Phillips Black 
Project, July 8, 2015), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55bd511ce4b0830374d25948/t/55f9d0abe4b0ab5c061abe90/1442435243965/J
uvenile+Life+Without+Parole+After+Miller++.pdf. 
13 Becker, Campaigning for Justice, chap. 11. 
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II. Current Literature 
1. International Human Rights Law Framework 
Global consensus against juvenile life without parole sentences is reflected in international 
and regional human rights treaties and mechanisms. First, the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, the world’s most widely ratified human rights treaty, explicitly prohibits sentencing juvenile 
offenders to life without parole. Article 37(a) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
states that 
Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without the possibility of release shall be imposed for 
offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age.14 
Article 37 specifically sets the age of eighteen in the provision: thereby highlighting the 
significance of age “in contrast with other rights which in Article 1 defers to domestic laws for the 
age of majority.”15 However, the United States has not ratified the CRC despite signing it 1995.16 
Second, juvenile life without parole sentences are also implicitly prohibited in Article 14(4) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which states that in the case 
of juvenile persons, imprisonment should promote rehabilitation. Juvenile life without parole 
sentences do not promote rehabilitation as the sentence “reflects a determination that there is 
nothing that can be done to render the child a fit member of society … [and] is a sentence of 
permanent banishment.”17 Although the U.S. ratified the ICCPR, it attached a reservation on 
Article 14(4), stating that “the United States reserves the right, in exceptional circumstances, to 
                                           
14 Emphasis added. 
15 “Brief of Amici Curiae Amnesty International, et Al. in Support of Petitioners” (Amnesty International et al., 
2012), 22, https://eji.org/sites/default/files/miller-amicus-amnesty-international.pdf. 
16 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, The Rest of Their Lives (U.S.: Human Rights Watch/Amnesty 
International, 2005), 99. 
17Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, 95-96. 
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treat juveniles as adults, notwithstanding … paragraph 4 of article 14.”18 The reservation did not 
explicitly state that the U.S. will continue to impose the juvenile life without parole sentence, but 
that the state would treat juveniles as adults in exceptional cases: leaving open the possibility to 
sentence juveniles to life without parole. 
Regional human rights treaties also reflect global consensus on the prohibition of juvenile 
life without parole sentences and the need to provide minors with special protection. The two 
bodies of human rights treaties that establish the Inter-American Human Rights System, the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of the Man and the American Convention on 
Human Rights, both highlight that minors have the right to special protection. First, Article VII of 
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of the Man, which the United States has signed 
and ratified, states that “all children have the right to special protection, care and aid.” Second, 
Article 19 of the American Convention on Human Rights also states that “[e]very minor child has 
the right to the measures of protection required by his condition as a minor on the part of his family, 
society, and the state.” The United States has not ratified the American Convention on Human 
Rights. 
In addition to the substantive provisions of international human rights treaties, UN treaty 
bodies that monitor the implementation of the treaties have called for the United States to abandon 
the sentence. In its 2014 review of the U.S., the UN Human Rights Committee expressed concern 
that U.S. courts may still impose life without parole sentences to juvenile offenders and called for 
                                           





the U.S. to prohibit and abolish the sentence.19 In its 2014 Concluding Observations on the U.S., 
the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination highlighted the racial 
disproportionality in which juveniles are sentenced to life without parole and called upon the U.S. 
to prohibit and abolish the sentence. 20  In the same year, the UN Committee against Torture 
emphasized how juveniles in the U.S. are sentenced to life without parole “even where the child 
played a minimal role in the crime,” and recommended that the U.S. abolish the sentence and 
“enable child offenders currently serving life without parole to have their cases reviewed by a court 
for reassessment and resentencing, to restore parole eligibility and for a possible reduction of the 
sentence.”21 
2. Supreme Court Decisions on Juvenile Life Without Parole 
Current literature on efforts to end juvenile life without parole in the U.S. has primarily 
focused on litigation at the federal level, particularly the three Supreme Court decisions, Roper v. 
Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama. The Roper decision barred the juvenile death 
penalty.22 In 2010, Graham v. Florida banned the sentencing of life without parole for juveniles 
convicted of non-homicide crimes.23 In 2012, the Supreme Court’s joint decision of Miller v. 
Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs held that mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles 
                                           
19 “Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America” (Human Rights 
Committee, April 23, 2014), 10, http://undocs.org/CCPR/C/USA/CO/4. 
20 “Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh to Ninth Periodic Reports of the United States of America” 
(Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, September 25, 2014), 10, 
http://undocs.org/CERD/C/USA/CO/7-9. 
21 “Concluding Observations on the Combined Third to Fifth Periodic Reports of the United States of America” 
(Committee against Torture, December 19, 2014), 12, http://undocs.org/CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5. 
22 Roper v. Simmons. 
23 Graham v. Florida. 
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convicted of homicide related crimes are unconstitutional. 24  Often referred to as the Roper-
Graham-Miller trilogy, several arguments, logic, and messages have been repeatedly utilized in 
each of the three cases. This section will examine these recurring arguments and their effectiveness 
which can be inferred through the Court’s citation to the specific arguments in its decision. The 
section will then provide a summary of the Miller decision, as Miller has been a reference point to 
examine rapid change at the state-level. 
Reference to psychological, neurobiological studies 
 Scientific studies of adolescent brain research that confirm that youth are less culpable than 
adults were cited in all three of the Supreme Court decisions. For example, Laurence Steinberg 
and Elizabeth Scott’s research outlined three factors that reduce juvenile’s criminal responsibility.25 
First, “adolescents’ levels of cognitive and psychological development … may undermine 
competent decision making.”26 Second, adolescents are “more vulnerable … to the influence of 
coercive circumstances … such as provocation, duress, or threat.”27 Third, “because adolescents 
are still in the process of forming their personal identity, their criminal behavior is less likely than 
that of an adult to reflect bad character” and thus have a greater capacity for change. 28 The 
American Psychological Association (APA) also submitted amici that confirmed the scientific and 
sociological studies of juvenile developmental immaturity. The Supreme Court cited Steinberg and 
                                           
24 Miller v. Alabama. 
25 Laurence Steinberg and Elizabeth S Scott, “Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence,” American Psychologist 58, 
no. 12 (2003): 1009–18. 
26 Steinberg and Scott, “Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence,” 1009-18. 
27 Steinberg and Scott, 1009-18. 
28 Steinberg and Scott, “Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence,” 1011. 
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Scott’s research as well as the APA’s amicus brief in its decisions in Miller. Steinberg argues that 
“neuroscientific evidence was probably persuasive to the Court not because it revealed something 
new about the nature of adolescence but precisely because it aligned with common sense and 
behavioral science.”29 In fact, this scientific narrative was not only critical to the Supreme Court 
decisions on JLWOP, “but the view that “kids are different” has had spillover effects to broader 
juvenile justice reforms as well.”30 
Reference to international law and foreign practice 
The stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world that officially 
sanctions and imposes juvenile life without parole sentences has been highlighted by various actors. 
Both in Graham and Miller, human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch submitted amicus briefs stating that international human rights law prohibits JLWOP 
sentences and urged the Court to “consider international and foreign law and practice in its 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s clause prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment.”31 The 
Court noted international law’s prohibition of JLWOP sentences and U.S. isolation in practicing 
the sentence in Graham. On the other hand, in the Miller decision, international law is conspicuous 
only for its absence. However, advocates have recognized that “[a]t the federal level, references to 
foreign and international law have historically been most effective in cases dealing with the Eighth 
                                           
29 Laurence Steinberg, “The Influence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court Decisions about Adolescents’ 
Criminal Culpability,” Nature Reviews. Neuroscience; London 14, no. 7 (July 2013): 513, 
http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/10.1038/nrn3509. 
30 Ashley Nellis, A Return to Justice : Rethinking Our Approach to Juveniles in the System (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2015), 83. 
31 Davis, Kalb, and Kaufman, Human Rights Advocacy in the United States, 54. 
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Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.”32 
Miller v. Alabama 
On June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he Eighth Amendment forbids a 
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile homicide 
offenders.”33 
The Court relied on two strands of precedent as a basis for the decision. First, citing 
Steinberg and Scott’s research on youth developmental psychology, the Court ruled that the 
diminished culpability of children under the age of 18 requires consideration of adolescence as a 
mitigating factor. Thus, mandatory sentencing that “prohibit[s] a sentencing authority from 
assessing whether the law’s harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile 
offender” and can carry a life without parole sentence for juveniles is unconstitutional.34 The 
second line of precedents found that the similarities of juvenile life without parole sentences and 
juvenile death penalty “show the flaws of imposing mandatory life without parole sentences on 
juvenile homicide offenders.”35 
3. State Courts’ and State Legislatures’ Reactions to Miller 
Documentation on state-level change since Miller has focused on the final outcome rather 
than on the process and various arguments, norms, logic, and messages utilized to create such 
                                           
32 Davis, Kalb, and Kaufman, 54. 
33 Miller v. Alabama. Emphasis added. 
34 Miller v. Alabama. 
35 Miller v. Alabama. 
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change.36 Since the Supreme Court’s decision on Miller in 2012, an additional 18 states and the 
District of Columbia have categorically prohibited JLWOP sentences either through state supreme 
court holdings or state legislation: adding up to a total of 21 states and the District of Columbia. 
In states where the sentence can still be imposed, “the legislatures and courts have diminished its 
impact through retroactivity rulings that provide every juvenile an opportunity to receive a lesser 
sentence, reforms to narrow the application of JLWOP, or a combination of the two.”37  
While literature on a comprehensive analysis of the arguments, norms, logic, and 
messages utilized to abolish JLWOP at the state-level since 2012 is lacking, California’s case, 
particularly from 2002 to 2011, has been well documented. In its campaign to introduce legislation 
to prohibit JLWOP sentencing, Human Rights Watch conducted research on California’s practice 
of the sentencing that revealed profound racial disparities, approached state senators with a 
professional background on child psychology, and appealed to the potential financial savings for 
reforming JLWOP legislation. 38 One notable dynamic was Human Rights Watch’s successful 
alliance with the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA) that traditionally 
had “an interest in maintaining a large prison population, which provided more jobs for its 
members.”39 Advocates persuaded CCPOA executives that “the possibility of parole would provide 
incentives for better behavior and consequently enhance safety for CCPOA’s members.”40  
                                           
36 Mills, Dorn, and Hritz, “Juvenile Life without Parole in Law and Practice”; “A State-by-State Look at Juvenile 
Life without Parole”; “Juvenile Life Without Parole After Miller v. Alabama.” 
37 Mills, Dorn, and Hritz, “Juvenile Life without Parole in Law and Practice,” 552. 
38 Becker, Campaigning for Justice, 224–29. 
39 Becker, 230. 
40 Becker, 231. 
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In addition, “precipitating factors, such as a dramatic event, [which] give the generalized 
beliefs a concrete target for collective action,” has also been utilized in California’s campaign.41 
One example was Sara Kruzan, who was sixteen when she killed the man who had raped her at age twelve 
and lured her into prostitution at age thirteen. Kruzan was tried as an adult and sentenced to life without 
parole. … The coalition made a video featuring Kruzan … the video was posted on YouTube and, by mid-
2010, had been viewed 280,000 times …42 
Such cases that evoke public sympathy had been repeatedly cited by the media and “favorable 
editorials from state and national papers before key votes” have been valuable for the campaign.43  
 In conclusion, the current academia’s focus on Supreme Court litigation and on the results 
of state-level change rather than the process leaves a gap to understand what arguments, norms 
logic, and messages have been employed and which have been effective since the Miller decision 
in 2012.   
                                           
41 Suzanne Staggenborg, Social Movements (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 14; Neil J. Smelser, Theory 
of Collective Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1971). 
42 Becker, Campaigning for Justice, 234–35. 




This research will conduct a series of case studies regarding each state that has abolished 
juvenile life without parole since Miller v. Alabama (2012) through state supreme court rulings or 
the passage of state legislation. The identification of which states have abolished the sentence since 
2012 was made through information provided by the Juvenile Sentencing Project.44 
For the states that have eliminated the sentence through state supreme court decisions, the 
research analyzed the court decision itself, referred to amicus briefs submitted by various 
stakeholders and case comments by academia.45 
For states that have abolished the sentence through legislation, the research first analyzed 
the bill itself, considering several factors including whether the bill bars the sentence prospectively 
and/or retroactively, whether the bill stipulates the required number of years’ incarceration for the 
juvenile offender to be eligible for parole, and whether the bill requires the judges or the parole 
board to consider the hallmark attributes of youth.46 The research also examines bill analyses 
provided by the state legislatures, interviews of lawmakers who sponsored the bill, press releases 
of national and local human rights organizations that work extensively on eliminating juvenile life 
without parole, and local news reports that have covered the legislation process.  
                                           
44 “Juvenile Sentencing Project: A Resource for Advocates, Courts, and Legislatures,” accessed December 7, 2018, 
https://juvenilesentencingproject.org/. 
45 Iowa, Massachusetts, and Washington have abolished juvenile life without parole through state supreme court 
decisions. 
46 Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Nevada, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming have abolished juvenile life 
without parole through state legislation. 
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IV. Findings and Discussion 
1. Overview 
Since Miller v. Alabama (2012), 18 states and the District of Columbia have abolished 
juvenile life without parole sentences through state supreme court decisions or state legislation. 
Three state supreme courts have ruled the sentencing practice unconstitutional and 15 states and 
the District of Columbia have passed legislation that effectively bars the sentence. The following 
two sections will first lay out the findings of the case studies conducted for each state, including 
the effect of each court decision or legislation and the arguments made at each state. The last 
section will then analyze the arguments, norms, logic, and messages utilized at the state-level and 
highlight certain factors that may impact the effectiveness of the arguments. 
2. State Supreme Court Decisions 
Iowa: State v. Sweet (2016) 
In 2016, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that sentencing juveniles to life without parole 
violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment clause of article I, section 17 of the 
Iowa Constitution. 
In 2012, Isaiah Sweet, then 17 years old, shot and killed Richard Sweet and Jane Sweet. 
Richard Sweet was Isaiah Sweet’s biological grandfather. Isaiah Sweet pleaded guilty to two 
counts of first-degree murder. The district court accepted the guilty plea and ordered a presentence 
investigative report to be prepared to outline the facts surrounding the crime. The report included 
information regarding Sweet’s juvenile arrest history, education, family dynamics, psychological, 
emotional, and personal health, history of drug abuse, and other behavioral characteristics. The 
report revealed Sweet’s tumultuous family dynamics, his diagnosis of Attention Deficit Disorder 
15 
 
(ADD) and experience of symptoms of mania or Bipolar Disorder, his attempts to commit suicide, 
and his tendency to undertake risky or reckless activities. During the sentencing hearings, Sweet 
offered the testimony of Dr. Stephen Hart, a clinical psychologist who testified that it was “simply 
not possible to determine whether Sweet would develop a full-blown psychopathic personality 
disorder as an adult, and even if he did, psychologists could not say whether it could be 
untreatable.”47 However, the district court sentenced Sweet to life without parole, stressing that the 
crimes were premeditated and that Dr. Hart’s assessment of Sweet’s possibility of rehabilitation 
was too optimistic. 
In his appeal, Sweet argued that life sentences without the possibility of parole should be 
categorically banned for juvenile offenders under the Iowa Constitution. Thus, the Iowa Supreme 
Court sought to reach a judgment on whether juvenile life without parole sentences should be 
categorically banned as it violates article I, section 17’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment clause of the Iowa Constitution.  
The Court adopted a two-step process in its deliberation. First, the Court examined whether 
there is a national consensus or at least an emerging consensus prohibiting the sentencing scheme. 
While the Court concluded that “evidence of consensus on the general proposition that “youth are 
different” is not subject to dispute, … [the Court did not] … find a consensus today on the very 
narrow question … whether the small number of juvenile offenders convicted of murder may be 
sentenced at time of trial to life in prison without the possibility of parole or whether such 
determination must be made at a later date by a parole board.”48    
                                           
47 State v. Sweet, No. 879 N.W. 2d 811 (The Supreme Court of Iowa 2016). 
48 State v. Sweet.  
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Unable to find a national consensus on the latter matter, the Court exercised its independent 
judgment to determine the constitutionality of the sentence. The Court pointed to the fallacy of the 
predictive enterprise, in that it is too speculative to make a conclusion that a juvenile offender is 
irretrievable. The Court stressed that even professional psychologists cannot reach a definitive 
assessment on the incorrigibility of a juvenile offender and that no structural or procedural 
approach can cure the fallacy. Citing neurobiological evidence of adolescent brain development, 
the Court concluded that “juvenile offenders’ prospects for rehabilitation augur forcefully against 
speculative, up-front determinations of opportunities for parole and leads inexorably to the 
categorical elimination of life-without-the-possibility-of-parole sentences for juvenile 
offenders.”49 
The norms, logic, and arguments that are embedded in Miller can be found in Sweet’s 
appeal as well as in the Court’s deliberation. Citing amicus briefs submitted by the American Bar 
Association and the American Psychological Association in the Miller decision, Sweet argued that 
the abandonment of juvenile life without parole sentences has been supported by such professional 
organizations. Separately, Sweet also pointed to the absence of the sentencing scheme in foreign 
practice as the United States is the only country in the world that continues to impose juvenile life 
without parole. 
In the process of its deliberation, the Court also refers to the Miller decision as well as the 
amicus briefs filed for Miller. In particular, the Court cites neurobiological studies by Laurence 
Steinberg and Elizabeth Scott that were frequently cited in the Roper-Graham-Miller decisions. 
The psychological and neurobiological features of adolescence identified in the studies, 
                                           
49 State v. Sweet. 
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particularly the immaturity and impressionability of youth, provided persuasive evidence to 
support the fallacy of predicting the incorrigibility of a juvenile offender. Further, the Court also 
cites amicus briefs in the Miller decision. The Court cites the American Bar Association’s amicus 
brief to Miller in noting that the U.S. is the only country in the world that imposes juvenile life 
without parole. Citing the American Psychological Association’s amicus brief to Miller, the Court 
emphasizes that professional psychologists cannot predict the irretrievability of a juvenile offender. 
Finally, the Court also refers to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decision, Diatchenko 
v. District Attorney, as evidence of possible national consensus supporting the prohibition of 
juvenile life without parole sentences. 
Massachusetts: Diatchenko v. District Attorney (2013) 
In 2013, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that both the mandatory and 
discretionary imposition of juvenile life without parole sentences violates the prohibition of cruel 
or unusual punishment clause of article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  
In 1981, Gregory Diatchenko, then 17 years old, stabbed Thomas Warf nine times. Warf 
was later pronounced dead. Diatchenko was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 
mandatory juvenile life without parole. Diatchenko’s appeals were rejected in 1982. However, 
following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama in 2012, Diatchenko appealed 
the constitutionality of juvenile life without parole sentences and called for the sentence to be 
abolished categorically.  
The Court deliberated on whether juvenile life without parole sentences should be 
categorically banned as it violates the prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment of article 26 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
18 
 
The Court concluded that juvenile life without parole sentences are unconstitutionally 
disproportionate to the young offender. Because the juvenile’s brain is not fully developed, “a 
judge cannot ascertain, with any reasonable degree of certainty, whether imposition of this most 
severe punishment is warranted.”50 The Court also noted that because adolescents have diminished 
culpability and greater prospects for reform, they are less deserving of the most severe punishments. 
Further, the Court stated that the distinctive attributes of juveniles render the penological 
justifications for imposing life without parole sentences – incapacitation, retribution, and 
deterrence – suspect. 
In the process of its deliberation, the Court frequently refers to the Miller decision. In its 
reiteration that children are constitutionally different, have diminished culpability and greater 
prospects for reform, and are less deserving of the most severe punishments, the Court cites the 
parallel reasoning in Miller. However, key to the Court’s “broader application of Miller is its focus 
on contemporary moral standards and concepts of decency.” 51  Referring to state case law 
precedents, the Court stresses that the analysis of disproportionality occurs “in light of 
contemporary standards of decency which mark the progress of society.”52 
The decision of Diatchenko v. District Attorney triggered subsequent legislation in 
Massachusetts in 2013. Massachusetts House Bill 4307 established a three-tier parole eligibility 
system and created avenues for less restrictive custody for juveniles, including treatment, 
education, and training. Such legislation suggests that court decisions “could have a broader impact 
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on the way judges and juries assess the culpability of juveniles in criminal cases, reflecting societal 
acceptance of the view that with appropriate sentences and rehabilitation programs, many youthful 
offenders can indeed become productive law-abiding adults.”53 
Washington: State v. Bassett (2018) 
In 2018, the Supreme Court of Washington ruled that sentencing juvenile offenders to life 
without the possibility of parole or early release is cruel punishment and therefore unconstitutional 
under article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution. 
In 1996, then 16-year-old Brian Bassett allegedly shot and killed his mother and father and 
drowned his brother in the bathtub. Bassett was convicted of three counts of aggravated first-
degree murder. Bassett was sentenced to three consecutive terms of life without parole. At the time, 
life without parole was a mandatory sentence for aggravated first degree murder in Washington. 
Following the Miller decision in 2012, the Washington state legislature enacted the so-
called Miller-fix statute which required sentencing courts to consider the Miller factors such as the 
diminished culpability of juvenile offenders before sentencing 16 or 17-year-olds to life without 
parole. Under the Miller-fix statute, in 2015, Bassett appeared for resentencing and presented 
various evidence in his mitigation documents, including his childhood life experience, the stressors 
of homelessness and rejection from his parents, evidence of his grown emotional and behavioral 
maturity, efforts to pursue an education and successfully earning a full scholarship for college. 
However, the sentencing judge rejected most of the evidence Bassett presented and imposed three 
consecutive life without parole sentences. Bassett appealed, and his case made its way to the 
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Washington Supreme Court. 
In his appeal, Bassett argued that imposing life without parole sentences on juvenile 
offenders is categorically a cruel punishment and therefore unconstitutional under article I, section 
14 of the Washington Constitution. The Washington Supreme Court deliberated on whether to 
adopt a categorical approach in examining the constitutionality of juvenile life without parole 
sentences and whether the sentencing scheme is cruel and therefore prohibited based on article I, 
section 14 of the state’s Constitution. 
First, the Court deliberated whether to adopt a categorical approach in its analysis of 
juvenile life without parole sentences or adopt the so-called Fain proportionality test. The latter 
approach requires the individual consideration of “(1) the nature of the offense, (2) the legislative 
purpose behind the statute, (3) the punishment the defendant would have received, (4) the 
punishment meted out for other offenses in the same jurisdiction.”54 The Court concludes that a 
categorical bar analysis is required because Bassett’s claim is a categorical challenge based on the 
hallmark propensities of a specific offender class – children.  
Adopting a categorical bar approach, the Court then deliberates whether juvenile life 
without sentences are categorically unconstitutional by conducting a two-step analysis: whether 
there is a national trend prohibiting the sentencing scheme and then considering the Court’s 
independent judgment based on its own understanding and interpretation of the cruel punishment 
provision. 
First, the Court concludes that a strong and rapid national trend of abolishing juvenile life 
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without parole sentences exists. The Court noted the fact that 20 states and the District of Columbia 
have categorically abolished the sentence. Also, a vast majority of the states, 17, have done so after 
the Miller decision in 2012. An additional four states no longer have anyone serving the sentence, 
and others have significantly limited its imposition. The number of states abandoning the sentence 
and the consistency in the direction of change provided sufficient evidence for the Court to 
conclude that the U.S. has reached a national consensus to prohibit juvenile life without parole. 
Second, in its independent judgment, the Court examines the culpability of juvenile 
offenders, the severity of the punishment of juvenile life without parole, and the penological 
justifications of the sentencing scheme. Neuroscientific and psychological studies confirm the 
immaturity, impetuosity, and impressionability of adolescents. These adolescent propensities 
diminish the culpability of juvenile offenders. Second, life without parole sentences imposed on 
juveniles is especially harsh for children because they will “on average serve more years and a 
greater percentage of [their] li[ves] in prison than an adult offender.”55 Finally, the distinctive 
attributes of youth weaken the penological goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation. The diminished culpability of youth weakens the goal of retribution. Minors’ lack 
of ability to anticipate the consequences of their actions weakens the goal of deterrence. The 
judgment that children are incorrigible cannot be made at such an early stage and thus weakens 
the goal of incapacitation and rehabilitation. 
State v. Bassett very frequently cites the Roper-Graham-Miller trilogy and refers to 
relevant studies and state supreme court decisions in its opinion. First, in its deliberation on 
whether to adopt a categorical bar approach, the Court cites the Miller reasoning that considers the 
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hallmark characteristics of youth. Second, in its examination of whether a national consensus exists 
in abolishing juvenile life without parole sentences, the Court cites State v. Sweet and Diatchenko 
v. District Attorney as evidence of the growing number of states that are abolishing the sentence. 
Although Sweet failed to find a national consensus that bars the sentencing, Bassett made the 
opposite conclusion. In addition, the Court cites a report by the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing 
of Youth that specifies the states that have no inmates serving juvenile life without parole.56 
The Court’s independent analysis also refers to the Miller decision frequently. In 
highlighting the diminished culpability of adolescents, the Court refers to the neuroscientific 
studies underlying Miller that “establish a clear connection between youth and decreased moral 
culpability for criminal conduct.”57 For its analysis of each of the four penological goals served by 
the sentence – retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation – the Court quotes Miller 
and the parallel analysis in the decision, particularly the latter two goals. The Juvenile Law Center, 
the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth 
and others filed an amicus brief arguing that adolescent neuroscience confirms that juvenile life 
without parole sentences do not serve precisely those four penological purposes.58 Although the 
Court decision did not specifically cite the amicus brief, its reference to the neuroscientific studies 
and how it weakens each of the four penological justifications suggest that the Court may have 
referred to the brief. 
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3. State Legislation 
Arkansas 
In 2017, the state of Arkansas passed Senate Bill 294 (SB 294) that eliminates life sentences 
without the possibility of parole as a sentencing option for minors. Juvenile offenders convicted 
of capital murder or treason would be eligible for parole after serving a minimum of 30 years’ 
imprisonment. Minors convicted of murder in the first degree would be eligible for parole after 
serving 25 years’ imprisonment. Juvenile offenders that are convicted with a criminal offense in 
which the death of another person did not occur would be eligible for parole after serving a 
minimum of 20 years’ imprisonment. 
SB 294 goes further to require the circuit court to ensure that a comprehensive mental 
health evaluation of the juvenile offender is conducted, including information such as family 
interviews, prenatal history, developmental history, medical history, history of treatment for 
substance abuse, social history, and a psychological evaluation. The information contained in the 
report is not admissible into evidence at a trial or sentencing hearing over the objections of the 
minor. During the parole eligibility hearing, the board is required to take into consideration 
multiple factors including, but not limited to, “the diminished culpability of minors, the hallmark 
features of youth, the person’s family and community circumstances at the time of the offense, 
including any history of abuse, trauma, and involvement in the child welfare system.”59 
The legislative intent section of the bill clearly states that the General Assembly 
“acknowledges and recognizes that minors are constitutionally different from adults and that these 
                                           




differences must be taken into account when minors are sentenced for adult crimes.”60 Citing the 
Roper-Graham-Miller trilogy, the legislature emphasizes that the distinctive psychological and 
neurobiological attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the 
harshest sentences to a minor.  The General Assembly also refers to the 20 states that have 
abolished juvenile life without parole as a sentencing option. 
Before the bill was voted on, Xavier McElrath-Bey, a young man who was formerly 
incarcerated for a crime committed when he was a minor and now works as a senior advisor for 
the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth (CFSY), was interviewed in a podcast by the 
Arkansas Advocates for Children and Families.61 In his interview, Mr. McElrath-Bey spoke of his 
challenging family and community circumstances at the time of the offense, how he became 
remorseful during his time of incarceration, and his journey to strive for a better life, academically 
improving, demonstrating positive change and creating a better legacy for formerly incarcerated 
youth. After the interview, an Arkansas resident and listener of the podcast called in, and stated 
that he had formerly supported life without parole sentences for any criminal regardless of age. 
However, after listening to what the possibility of parole meant for Mr. McElrath-Bey, he shared 
his hope that legislators would hear Mr. McElrath-Bey’s story before they cast their votes on the 
bill. 
In fact, the bill was co-sponsored by a representative who withdrew her opposition after 
meeting with advocates such as Xavier McElrath-Bey. SB 294 was co-sponsored by 
Representative Rebecca Petty, whose 12-year-old daughter was kidnapped, raped, and murdered 
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in 1999. Because of this traumatizing personal experience, Representative Petty had opposed a 
similar bill in 2015.62 However, after meeting with CFSY senior advisor Xavier McElrath Bey and 
Linda White, a CFSY partner who advocates to end juvenile life without parole sentences despite 
her experience of losing her daughter to youth violence, Representative Petty not only withdrew 
her opposition, but became a lead sponsor of the bill in the House.63 Representative Petty addressed 
the House that her “decision to run this legislation was not an easy one due to [her] own struggles 
and with the state criminal justice system, but [that she] put a lot of time and heart and studying 
and energy into this”64 Representative Petty also added that because the legislation ensures the 
eligibility of parole for offenders, the state could also save millions of dollars that would otherwise 
be spent in administering lengthier prison terms.65 
California 
 In 2017, the state of California passed Senate Bill 394 which retroactively eliminated the 
sentencing of juvenile offenders to life without the possibility of parole.66 The legislation requires 
the state to offer those sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed when they were under 
18 years old the eligibility of parole during his or her 25th year of incarceration. 
 The Bill Analysis summarizes the arguments made in support for the bill by the National 
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Center for Youth Law.67 This includes the fact that the United States is the only country in the 
world to impose the sentence, and the argument that U.S. “should comply with international human 
rights law and norms.” 68  The arguments also include the psychological differences between 
children and adults and the capacity of youth to change, mature, and rehabilitate. In addition, the 
racial disparities of the sentencing are highlighted, particularly the fact that in California, African 
American youth are sentenced to life without parole “at a rate that is 18 times that of white 
youth.”69 
 State Senators Ricarda Lara and Holly Mitchell co-sponsored the bill, emphasizing that the 
United States is the only country in the world that sanctions and imposes life without parole 
sentences to juvenile offenders.70 Senator Lara particularly highlighted the distinctive attributes of 
youth, such as their unique capacity to learn, rehabilitate, and change and that “even those who 
commit crimes deserve a second chance.”71  
 Elizabeth Calvin, Senior Advocate of the Children’s Rights Division at Human Rights 
Watch who spearheaded the legislative campaign, stressed that California “continues to reform its 
laws to ensure that children are treated with mercy by the criminal justice system, and that their 
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unique potential for positive change is recognized.”72 The campaign was supported by a wide base 
of communities, ranging from child and teen welfare groups, Christian evangelical groups, public 
defenders, psychology experts, and even to some victims’ advocacy groups.73 In addition, formerly 
incarcerated members of the Anti-Recidivism Coalition personally advocated for the bill through 
sharing their stories which demonstrated that positive change and rehabilitation is possible.74  
 Prior to SB 394, in 2012, the state of California passed SB 9 which allowed individuals 
sentenced to life without parole for offenses committed when they were minors to petition for a 
resentencing hearing. Although the passage of SB 9 represented the successful efforts by advocates 
to utilize statistics and documentation, galvanize a broad base, and effectively engage with media 
outlets, the bill itself did not guarantee a parole hearing or resentencing hearing.75 Because of this 
loophole, the California Supreme Court found that SB 9 provided inadequate protections required 
by the U.S. Supreme Court decision Miller v. Alabama.76 As a result, SB 394 was introduced and 
signed into law in 2017. 
Colorado 
 In 2016, the state of Colorado enacted SB 16-181 which retroactively eliminates life 
without parole sentences imposed on minors. The bill provides that juvenile offenders convicted 
of a class 1 felony that was committed “on or after July 1, 1990 and before July 1, 2006, and who 
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received a sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole” shall be sentenced to “a 
term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving a period of 40 years.”77 If the 
felony for which the person was convicted is murder in the first degree, the district court may 
sentence the person to a determinate sentence between 30 to 50 years’ imprisonment or to a term 
of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving 40 years. If the felony is not murder 
in the first degree, the district court may sentence the person to life imprisonment with the 
possibility of parole after 40 years of imprisonment. 
 Prior to the passage of SB 16-181, in 2006, the state of Colorado prospectively abolished 
imposing life without parole sentences to juvenile offenders but the legislation did not apply 
retroactively. As a result, 48 juvenile offenders who were sentenced to life without parole between 
1990 and 2006, when the sentencing was an option, were not eligible for the possibility of parole.78 
However, SB 16-181 “offered the 48 offenders … an opportunity to be resentenced in a manner 
that complies with the central tenet of Miller.”79 
Connecticut 
In 2015, the state of Connecticut passed Senate Bill 796 that effectively eliminated the 
sentencing of life without parole to minors. Juvenile offenders who received a sentence of more 
than 10 years imprisonment are guaranteed a parole hearing. If the individual is sentenced to less 
than 50 years, he or she shall be eligible for parole after serving 60% of the sentence or twelve 
years, whichever is longer. If the individual is sentenced to more than 50 years, he or she shall be 
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eligible for parole after serving 30 years. 
SB 796 goes further to specify youth-related factors for the parole board to consider during 
the parole hearings of inmates serving sentences for the crimes they have committed before they 
were 18 years old. These factors include, but are not limited to, “the age and circumstances of such 
person as of the date of the commission of the crime or crimes, whether such person has 
demonstrated remorse and increased maturity since the date of the commission of the crime or 
crimes, … , trauma, [and the] lack of education or obstacles that such person may have faced as a 
child or youth in the adult correctional system…”80 
Edie Joseph, on behalf of Connecticut Voices for Children, a research-based advocacy 
organization that works to promote the well-being of Connecticut’s youth, testified before the state 
legislature’s Judiciary Committee in support of SB 796. First, she emphasized that the bill has 
received broad support from a wide range of communities, such as “the Connecticut Sentencing 
Commission, a bipartisan group of judges, law enforcement and prison officials, prosecutors, 
public defenders, and citizens that also received extensive input from the victim advocate and the 
public.”81 Notably, Ms. Joseph expressed concern of the significant racial and ethnic disparities in 
the lengthy sentences imposed on juveniles, citing data that “88% of individuals serving sentences 
of greater than ten years for juvenile crimes are black or Hispanic.”82 She also cites multiple 
neuroscientific studies of youth that confirm that the last neurodevelopmental features to develop 
in adolescents are those that control decision making and proper understanding of the 
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consequences of actions. 83  Finally, Ms. Joseph highlights the Roper-Graham-Miller trilogy’s 
reasoning that the hallmark features of youth – immaturity, impetuosity, and impressionability – 
require the recognition that children are constitutionally different from adults. 
Delaware 
In 2013, the state of Delaware passed Senate Bill 9 that limited the sentencing of life 
without the possibility of parole to juvenile offenders.84 Under SB 9, juvenile offenders convicted 
of first-degree murder shall be sentenced to a term of incarceration from 25 years to life, and shall 
be eligible to petition the Superior Court for sentence modification after the offender has served 
30 years. Juvenile offenders sentenced to more than 20 years’ imprisonment for any offense or 
offenses other than first-degree murder shall be eligible to petition the Superior Court for sentence 
modification after the offender has served 20 years. However, the eligibility to petition the Superior 
Court for sentence modification leaves a loophole in which life without parole remains an option 
for juvenile offenders.85 
District of Columbia 
 In 2016, the District of Columbia passed D.C. Act 21-568, the Comprehensive Youth 
Justice Amendment Act, that eliminates life without parole as a sentencing option for juvenile 
offenders. The Act specifically states that “the court shall not impose a sentence of life 
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imprisonment without the possibility of parole or release” if the person was convicted of a crime 
her or she committed while under 18 years of age.86 The bill also provides that the court may reduce 
the term of imprisonment imposed upon a juvenile if the defendant has served at least 20 years in 
prison, and if the court finds that the defendant is not a danger to society and that the interests of 
justice warrant a sentence modification. The Act also contains provisions regarding the improving 
of youth services and rehabilitation enhancement and improving conditions of confinement for 
juveniles. The Act was passed unanimously by the Council of the District of Columbia.87 
 Councilmember Kenyan McDuffie, who sponsored the bill, stated that “the bill is 
incredibly important because it recognizes that young people must fundamentally be treated 
differently from adults – that they have a capacity to change and be rehabilitated. In that vein, 
adults who committed crimes much earlier in their lives as youth should have an opportunity for 
judicial review of their sentences after a certain period of time.” 88  In addressing opposition, 
Councilmember McDuffie stressed that the incarceration reduction provision “isn’t about giving 
people a slap on the wrist,” but about “giving people consequences that are age-appropriate.”89 
Councilmember McDuffie worked closely with the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth 
(CFSY), the Campaign for Youth Justice, and D.C. Lawyers for Youth to pass the bill. 
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 In particular, members of CFSY’s Incarcerated Children’s Advocacy Network who have 
been previously incarcerated, Andre Williams and Eddie Ellis provided testimony to the Council. 
Mr. Williams was sentenced to life without parole for a non-homicide, drug related crime as a teen 
and was released after serving 23 years: Mr. Ellis was convicted with murder when he was 16 
years old, sentenced to 22 years, served 15 years and finished the rest of his time on parole.90 Both 
members’ personal stories provided powerful testimony to the Council that youth have a unique 
capacity to change and deserve a second chance.91 
Hawaii 
In 2014, the state of Hawaii passed House Bill 2116 and abolished juvenile life without 
parole sentences. HB 2116 states that juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder or first-
degree attempted murder shall be sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. 
The bill does not specify the minimum number of years’ imprisonment required for the defendant 
to serve to gain parole eligibility. 
HB 2116 clearly recognizes that children are constitutionally different from adults and 
through citing the Roper-Graham-Miller trilogy. The bill emphasizes that the distinctive attributes 
of youth render the penological justifications of imposing the harshest sentences to juvenile 
offenders void. Notably, the bill also recognizes that international law prohibits the imposition of 
juvenile life without parole and the absence of foreign practice of imposing the sentence. The bill 
states: 
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The legislature further acknowledges that the United States is the only nation in the world that allows 
children to be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, in violation of Article of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which categorically bars the imposition of “capital punishment [or] 
life imprisonment without the possibility of release … for offenses committed by persons below eighteen 
years of age.92 
 State Representative Karen Awana, who co-sponsored the bill, stated that HB 2116 “created 
parity in our laws by recognizing that children are different from adults when it comes to criminal 
sentencing and that they should not be subject to our state’s toughest penalties.”93 State prosecutors 
in Hawaii also supported the passage of the bill. For example, Kauai County Prosecuting Attorney 
Justin Kollar praised the legislature’s acknowledgement that children are different from adults and 
emphasized that “when children commit serious crimes, we in law enforcement must respond and 
protect the community; however, putting a child in prison and throwing away the key is not a 
humane or cost-effective solution to this problem.”94 
Nevada 
Nevada passed Assembly Bill 267 in 2015 and abolished juvenile life without parole 
sentences. Specifically, the bill states that “life imprisonment without the possibility of parole must 
not be imposed or inflicted upon any person convicted of a crime … who at the time of the 
commission of the crime was less than 18 years of age.”95 Juvenile offenders convicted of non-
homicide crimes will be eligible for parole after serving 15 calendar years of incarceration, and 
juveniles convicted of an offense or offenses that resulted in the death of one victim will be eligible 
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for parole after serving 20 calendar years of incarceration. The bill also requires state courts to 
consider the differences between juvenile and adult offenders, including, but not limited to, “the 
diminished culpability of juveniles compared to that of adults and the typical characteristics of 
youth.”96 The legislature passed the bill unanimously.97 
 Formerly incarcerated members of the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth’s 
Incarcerated Children’s Advocacy Network testified in hearings to support the bill. Xavier 
McElrath-Bey, who also played an important role in persuading Arkansas legislators to support 
abolishing juvenile life without parole sentences, testified with fellow members Mario Taylor, 
Marcus Dixon, and Traci Rutherford that children can change and deserve a second chance.98 The 
coalition received broad support in passing the bill, including support from “Democrats, 
Republicans, victims’ families, formerly incarcerated youth, and prosecutors.”99 
New Jersey 
 In 2017, New Jersey passed Act 373 that eliminated juvenile life without parole 
sentences.100 The bill requires that juvenile offenders convicted of murder shall be sentenced to a 
period of 30 years’ incarceration, in which he or she shall not be eligible for parole, or be sentenced 
to a specific term of years between 30 years and life imprisonment, in which he or she shall be 
eligible for parole after serving 30 years. 
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 The bill was introduced after the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that courts are required 
to evaluate the Miller factors – such as immaturity, failure to appreciate risks and consequences, 
family and home environment, family and peer pressures, and the possibility of rehabilitation – 
when a juvenile faces a “lengthy term of imprisonment that is the practical equivalent of life 
without parole.”101 
North Dakota 
North Dakota abolished juvenile life without parole sentences through the passage of 
House Bill 1195 in 2017. The bill states that courts may reduce the term of imprisonment for a 
defendant who was convicted of a crime he or she committed before he or she was 18 years of age 
if the defendant has served at least 20 years of imprisonment. The court must consider multiple 
factors in its deliberation in commuting a sentence, including, but not limited to, the “defendant’s 
family and community circumstances at the time of the offense, including any history of abuse, 
trauma, or involvement in the child welfare system … [and] the diminished culpability of juveniles 
compared to adults and the level of maturity and failure to appreciate the risks and 
circumstances.”102 The bill passed the state legislature unanimously.103 
Representative Lawrence R. Klemin, who sponsored the bill, said “this bill reflects our 
understanding that even children who commit serious crimes are capable of change” and that he 
“introduced this bill to give hope to those children who do change, so that they may have the 
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opportunity to demonstrate to a judge that they are deserving of a second chance.”104 The bill also 
received support from members of law enforcement. Leann Bertsch, director of the North Dakota 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, expressed support for the bill, stating that 
“[e]very day within the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation we see people who turn their lives 
around in prison, in spite of the obstacle of incarceration … Kids can and do grow up; and as they develop, 
they change. None of us are the same at 50 as we were at 16. Providing the possibility for judicial sentencing 
review decreases the likelihood of continued violent behavior behind bars and provides incentives to engage 
in meaningful rehabilitative programs so as to be considered more favorably by the sentencing court.”105 
South Dakota 
South Dakota passed Senate Bill 140 in 2016 that abolished juvenile life without parole 
sentences. SB 140 specifically states that “the penalty of life imprisonment may not be imposed 
upon any defendant for any offense committed when the defendant was less than eighteen years 
of age.106 The bill also provides that the maximum sentence for juvenile offenders convicted with 
a Class A, B, or C felony may be a term of years in the state penitentiary. 
Senator Craig Tieszen, who sponsored the bill, expressed strong support that children, 
“even children who commit terrible crimes, can and do change” and that he believes that children 
“deserve a chance to demonstrate that change and become productive citizens.”107 Senator Tieszen 
also pointed that the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth has provided important testimony, 
support, education and perspective to the legislators “to think differently about children’s capacity 
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In 2013, Texas passed Senate Bill 2 that eliminated life without parole sentences for 17-
year-olds convicted of a capital felony, furthering the protection for the age group which was 
formerly afforded to children under the age of 17. 109  As a result of the legislation, juvenile 
offenders under the age of 18 who are convicted with a capital felony would be mandatorily 
sentenced to life with the possibility of parole after serving 40 years. The bill was intended to 
comply with Miller v. Alabama which “contemplated juveniles as being under the age of 18” while 
the age of majority in Texas is 17 years.110 
While SB 2 has eliminated life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of a capital 
felony, replacing it with a mandatory sentence of life with parole after 40 years suggests that the 
bill “does not go far enough in acknowledging the fundamental difference between children and 
adults and children’s unique capacity for change and rehabilitation.” 111  In fact, state House 
Representatives argued that the bill may be unconstitutional because 40 years in prison before 
being eligible for parole is too long for a minor and would be “tantamount to a sentence of life 
without parole.” 112  State Senators also raised concerns that SB 2 does not comply with the 
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constitutional provisions set in the Miller case because the mandatory sentence does not allow for 
the consideration of individual factors concerning the hallmark attributes of youth required by 
Miller.113 In fact, the bill’s sponsor, Senator Joan Huffman, stated that the bill “addressed Texas’ 
historic policy of being tough on “the more heinous offenders” while still addressing the [Supreme] 
Court’s concerns.”114 
Utah 
Utah’s passage of House Bill 405 in 2016 prohibited life without parole sentences to 
juvenile offenders convicted of a capital crime.115 Instead, HB 405 provides that the maximum 
sentence that can be imposed to a minor convicted of a capital crime is an indeterminate prison 
term of not less than 25 years and that may be for life with the possibility of parole. 
The bill’s sponsor, Representative Lowry Snow applauded the passage of the bill, stating 
that “Utah’s criminal justice system has long recognized the fundamental difference between 
children and adult offenders” and that the passage of HB 405 “is an expression of that important 
recognition and it provides a clear statement of Utah’s policy regarding the treatment of children 
placed in custody for serious offenses.” 116  In an interview with the Liberstas Institute, 
Representative Snow highlighted that neuroscientific studies provide strong evidence that children 
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can be rehabilitated.117 In addition, pointing to the growing number of states abolishing juvenile 
life without parole sentences, Representative Snow emphasized the trend of a national recognition 
that children are different and that laws should treat children differently.118 Representative Snow 
also suggested that the religious idea of redemption may have resonated among more conservative 
lawmakers as “Utah is very prone to a recognition that there can be redemption and people can be 
given a second chance.”119 
Vermont 
In 2015, the state of Vermont passed H 62 that provides that a court “shall not sentence a 
person to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if the person was under 18 years of 
age at the time of the commission of the offense.”120 The bill does not specify the number of years’ 
incarceration a defendant is required to serve in order to be eligible for parole. 
 Representative Barbara Rachelson, who sponsored the bill, emphasized that Vermont has 
never imposed life without parole sentences to juvenile offenders but “will take a step further and 
take the crime off the books.”121 Representative Rachelson also pointed out that the United States 
is the only country in the world that still sanctions and imposes juvenile life without parole 
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sentences. State Senator Richard Sears, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated that 
Vermont’s passage of the bill was part of a “national push” that recognizes that “more has been 
learned about brain development and juvenile crime” making less sense to “sentence juveniles to 
life without parole, no matter how horrific the crime.”122 
West Virginia 
West Virginia passed House Bill 4210 in 2014 that prohibits juvenile life without parole 
sentences and instead requires that juvenile offenders be eligible for parole after he or she has 
served 15 years. The bill also requires the court to take into consideration multiple factors in 
determining the appropriate sentence for a juvenile offender convicted as an adult such as, but not 
limited to, “age at the time of the offense, impetuosity, family and community environment, … 
capacity for rehabilitation, … trauma history, … and other mitigating factors.”123 The bill also 
requires the parole board to take into consideration “the diminished culpability of juveniles as 
compared to that of adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and 
increased maturity of the prisoner during incarceration.”124 
Representative John Ellem, who co-sponsored the bill, published an op-ed in a magazine 
The Progressive, highlighting how HB 4210 not only acknowledges the potential for youth to grow, 
change, and rehabilitate, but also how granting the possibility of parole “helps to curb away the 
runaway costs of incarceration … [as] it costs an estimated $2.5 million to imprison a child for 
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life.” 125  Representative Ellem also highlighted how his religious beliefs strengthened his 
confidence that “all can be redeemed, particularly our children.”126 State Senator Corey Palumbo, 
Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, also reiterated that children are different from adults and 
deserve a second chance and that the bill also represents a sound fiscal policy.127 
Wyoming 
The state of Wyoming passed House Bill 23 in 2013 that eliminated life sentences without 
parole for juvenile offenders. HB 23 empowers the governor to commute a life sentenced imposed 
on a juvenile to a term of years. Accordingly, a minor sentenced to life imprisonment shall be 
eligible for parole “after commutation of his sentence to a term of years or after having served 25 
years of incarceration.”128 However, the bill does not apply retroactively.  
Wyoming Deputy Attorney General Dave Delicath stated that juvenile offenders who were 
sentenced to life without parole before the effective date of the legislation will not be affected by 
the bill because “their sentences were within the law allowed at the time.”129 
4. Analysis 
The arguments made at the state-level to support the abolition of juvenile life without 
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parole sentences can be subsumed under two broad categories: those that are based on the nature 
of children and those that stem from the nature of the sentence itself. The following section will 
discuss each of the arguments, norms, logic, and messages based on this framework, including 
examples of how some states have put these arguments into language. The final section will then 
address certain factors that may impact the effectiveness of these arguments. 
Nature of children 
 State courts and legislatures have drawn on scientific studies that confirm the distinctive 
psychological attributes of youth (particularly their immaturity, impressionability, and unformed 
character) as a basis for each of the further arguments related to the nature of children. All three 
main propensities, children’s immaturity, impressionability, and unformed character, provide 
evidence for children’s diminished culpability and the failure of the sentence to serve its 
penological justifications. The second attribute, children’s impressionability, mainly supports the 
message that children can change, have better prospects for reform and deserve a better chance. 
The last attribute, children’s unformed character, provides evidence that even professional 
psychologists cannot predict the incorrigibility of a juvenile offender. 
 Neuroscientific and psychological evidence of the immaturity, impressionability, and 
unformed character of youth has been the most frequently used argument to support eliminating 
juvenile life without parole sentences at the state-level. For example, the psychological study cited 
in the Roper-Graham-Miller trilogy, Laurence Steinberg and Elizabeth Scott’s research on 
children’s developmental immaturity and diminished responsibility, was referred to in all three 
state supreme court decisions.130 Lawmakers and advocates in Arkansas, California, Connecticut, 
                                           
130 Steinberg and Scott, “Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence.” 
43 
 
Hawaii, Utah, and Vermont also reiterated the scientific evidence of youth developmental 
psychology to emphasize the immaturity of juvenile offenders. The frequent usage of 
neuroscientific evidence may reflect its persuasiveness “not because it revealed something new 
about the nature of adolescence but precisely because it aligned with common sense and behavioral 
science.”131 
 The scientific studies of youth psychology have served as a basis for an additional argument 
that children have diminished culpability: thus, they do not deserve the most severe punishments. 
Citing the scientific research on adolescent brain development and psychology, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts’ decision in Diatchenko v. District Attorney particularly 
emphasized the disproportionality of juvenile life without parole sentences, “not with respect to 
the offense itself, but with regard to the particular offender.”132 
The main three psychological attributes of youth have also been adduced to argue that the 
sentence also does not serve its four penological goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation. The logic of this argument was most effectively outlined in the amicus brief by 
the Juvenile Law Center, ACLU, Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth (CFSY) and others, 
as well as the subsequent Washington Supreme Court holding State v. Bassett.133  
First, the case for retribution is weakened because youth developmental immaturity lessens 
the blameworthiness of juveniles. Second, the goal of deterrence is weakened because children 
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cannot assess the consequences of their actions: therefore, a juvenile would be unable to anticipate 
the harsh sentence he or she may receive as a result of his or her offense. Third, the case for 
incapacitation is weakened because judges and professional psychologists cannot predict the 
incorrigibility of juvenile offenders. Because judges and psychologists are unable to predict the 
irretrievability of a juvenile offender, they cannot justify incarcerating the offender for life without 
the possibility of parole. Finally, the goal of rehabilitation cannot be achieved because a life without 
parole sentence imposed on a juvenile inherently “forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”134 
The sentence’s failure to serve its penological justifications was more emphasized in state supreme 
court cases rather than in legislative campaigns. This may be because determining the 
constitutionality of a sentencing scheme requires the examination of whether “the challenged 
sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals.”135 
The second psychological attribute, the impressionability of children, supports the firm 
belief that children can change, have greater prospects for reform and thus deserve a second chance. 
This message was the second most frequently made argument by states to support abolishing 
juvenile life without parole. States such as California, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, West 
Virginia, Vermont, and the District of Columbia have emphasized children’s unique ability to 
change. Formerly incarcerated youth who testified in the legislative hearings in Arkansas, D.C., 
and Nevada provided a living demonstration that children can positively change and grow to 
become law-abiding members of society. Several lawmakers such as Representative John Ellem 
of West Virginia and Representative Lowry Snow of Utah emphasized how the religious idea of 
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redemption also supports the idea that children can change and therefore deserve a second 
chance.136 
The third psychological attribute, the unformed character of youth, also supports the 
argument that judges nor professional psychologists can predict the irretrievability of a juvenile 
offender. This argument was the crux of the State v. Sweet decision. Citing the American 
Psychology Association’s amicus brief to Miller, the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that  
sentencing courts should not be required to make speculative up-front decisions on juvenile offenders’ 
prospects for rehabilitation because they lack adequate predictive information supporting such a conclusion. 
The parole board will be better able to discern whether the offender is irreparably corrupt after time has 
passed, after opportunities for maturation and rehabilitation have been provided, and after a record of success 
or failure in the rehabilitative process is available.137 
In addition, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts emphasized that “because the brain of a 
juvenile is not fully developed, either structurally or functionally, by the age of eighteen, a judge 
cannot find with confidence that a particular offender, at that point in time, is irretrievably 
depraved.” 138  Therefore, a judge cannot ascertain whether “imposition of this most severe 
punishment is warranted.”139 
Nature of the sentence 
 The severity, patterns of domestic and foreign practice, the sentence’s prohibition under 
international law, fiscal cost, possible violent behavior, and racial disparities of life without parole 
sentences imposed on juveniles were reiterated to support the elimination of the sentence. 
 The harshness of the sentence, particularly when compared to the imposition of life without 
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parole on adults, was emphasized in State v. Bassett. The Washington Supreme Court highlighted 
the severity of the sentence especially for children. Citing Graham v. Florida, the Court reiterated 
that children sentenced to life without parole will “on average serve more years and a greater 
percentage of [their] li[ves] in prison than an adult offender.”140 
 State courts and legislatures also determined whether foreign practice, or lack thereof, and 
international law call for the prohibition of the sentence. The Iowa State Supreme Court decision 
and the legislative campaigns in California, Hawaii, and Vermont emphasized that the U.S. is the 
only country in the world that imposes the sentence.  
 However, the prohibition of juvenile life without parole under international human rights 
law was much less referred to as evidence to abolish the sentence. State supreme court decisions 
did not cite any international human rights treaties that bar the sentence. Such absence may be due 
to state jurists’ uncertainty “with how international human rights law claims should be treated in 
state courts.”141 The absence may also reflect state courts’ tendency to be generally “dismissive of 
the claim that they are bound by even the ratified instruments” of international human rights 
treaties. 142  Perhaps due to similar reasons, only a couple of state legislatures referred to 
international human rights treaties that prohibit juvenile life without parole sentences. Hawaii’s 
House Bill 2116 highlighted that the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child prohibits juvenile 
life without parole.143 In addition, the need to comply with international human rights law and 
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norms was argued for in California.144 
In addition to referring to foreign practice and international human rights law, states also 
highlighted the existence of a national consensus barring the sentence. The number of states that 
have abandoned the sentence and the consistency in the direction of change provides evidence of 
such national consensus. The Washington Supreme Court highlighted these trends in its decision: 
As of January 2018, 20 states and the District of Columbia have abolished life without parole for juveniles. 
This trend has occurred rapidly since Miller, before which only 4 states banned juvenile life without parole. 
Additionally, 4 states no longer have anyone serving a life without parole sentence under their respective 
statutes. Other states have limited the offenses that qualify for juvenile life without parole. Lastly, several 
states moved to provide parole eligibility to those sentenced to juvenile life without parole pre-Miller.145 
The Court concluded that there is a “clear trend” of states rapidly abandoning or limiting the 
imposition of the sentence. The Court also cited fellow state supreme court decisions of 
Massachusetts and Iowa that categorically abolished the sentence as further evidence of a national 
trend. 
 States have also stressed the fiscal and behavioral benefits of offering juvenile offenders 
the possibility of parole. First, highlighting the estimated cost of $2.5 million to incarcerate a 
juvenile offender for life, Representative John Ellem of West Virginia argued that providing the 
possibility of parole “helps curb away the runaway costs of incarceration.”146  Legislators of 
Arkansas and Hawaii also highlighted the fiscal benefits of offering the possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders.  
In terms of behavioral benefits of offering the possibility of parole, Leann Bertsch, director 
of the North Dakota Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, reiterated that it can decrease 
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violent behavior behind bars because parole possibility will serve as an incentive for inmates to 
engage in good behavior and participate in rehabilitation programs.147 
 While the arguments stated above have been made relatively frequently, the racial 
disparities in the imposition of juvenile life without parole have not been a major rationale for 
states to support the elimination of the sentence. Nonetheless, representatives of human rights 
organizations that have testified at legislative hearings have brought attention to the problem of 
racial disproportionality. The National Center for Youth Law emphasized that in California, 
African American youth are sentenced to life without parole at a rate that is 18 times that of white 
youth.148 Connecticut Voices for Children highlighted that 88% of juveniles serving sentences of 
greater than ten years are black or Hispanic.149 
Factors that may impact the effectiveness of certain arguments 
 The arguments, norms, logic, and messages laid out above tend to be more effective when 
presented by a particular source or when they are framed differently when presented to a particular 
audience. The impact of the arguments may be more effective when presented by formerly 
incarcerated youth or families of victims and a different method of framing may resonate among 
more conservative, religious audiences. 
 First, the persuasiveness of children’s ability to change and their deserving of a second 
chance tends to be more powerful when they are made by formerly incarcerated youth who were 
given that second chance. Members of CFSY’s Incarcerated Children’s Advocacy Network who 
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have had experiences of incarceration and rehabilitation testified at the legislative hearings in D.C. 
and Nevada to amplify the message that children can change and that they are not isolated 
exceptions to the rule but representations of what all children are capable of. The bills eliminating 
juvenile life without parole passed unanimously in D.C. and Nevada.150 
 Similarly, the arguments supporting the elimination of juvenile life without parole 
sentences may carry more weight when delivered by family members of victims of violence. For 
example, in Arkansas, Linda White, a CFSY partner who advocates for eliminating juvenile life 
without parole sentences despite losing her daughter to youth violence, met with state 
Representative Rebecca Petty who had also lost her daughter to violence. Because of her personal 
experience, Representative Petty had previously opposed a bill supporting more lenient sentencing 
for juveniles, but dropped her opposition and became a lead sponsor of the new bill eliminating 
juvenile life without parole after meeting with advocates including Linda White. Representative 
Petty addressed the House that her decision to sponsor the bill was not easy but that eliminating 
the sentence was in the better interest of the state. The bill passed the House 86 to 1.151 
 The arguments supporting the elimination of juvenile life without parole can be framed 
differently to resonate among certain audiences. While law-and-order conservatism tends to 
support more aggressive prosecutions and stricter sentences, many Republican-leaning states have 
successfully abolished juvenile life without parole. 152  The message that children, and even 
juveniles convicted of serious crimes, can change and deserve a second chance may be reframed 
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as an issue of religious redemption: an argument that “seems to resonate among more conservative, 
religious lawmakers.”153 For example, Representative Lowry Snow of Utah highlighted that “Utah 
is very prone to a recognition that there can be redemption and people can be given a second 
chance.”154 Representative John Ellem who co-sponsored the bill eliminating the sentence in West 
Virginia stressed how his religious beliefs that children can be redeemed supported his decision to 
provide juvenile offenders a second chance.155 Further, faith-based communities, such as Christian 
evangelical groups in California, joined state-level coalitions campaigning to abolish juvenile life 
without parole sentences.156  
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The arguments, norms, logic, and messages utilized at the state-level to support the 
elimination of juvenile life without parole sentences tend to either stem from the nature of children 
or from the nature of the sentence itself. Scientific studies that confirm the distinctive 
psychological attributes of youth have been adduced to argue for the diminished culpability of 
children, the inability of the sentence to serve its penological goals, children’s capacity of change, 
and the fallacy of the predictive enterprise to determine the incorrigibility of a juvenile offender. 
The harshness of the sentence itself, domestic and foreign practice, the prohibition of the sentence 
under international human rights law, the fiscal and behavioral benefits of offering the possibility 
of parole, and the racial disparities of the sentence have also been argued for at the state-level. The 
effectiveness of the arguments above may be enhanced when they are delivered by formerly 
incarcerated youth or victims of violence or when they are reframed as a religious ideal to a more 
conservative, religious audience. 
Although state supreme court decisions and state legislation did not refer to international 
human right law frequently, utilizing an international human rights framework may provide 
advocates with an additional tool to pressure states to abolish juvenile life without parole sentences. 
Advocates can highlight that the state’s imposition of the sentence contravenes international 
human rights treaties such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Advocates can also 
emphasize UN treaty body recommendations that call for the U.S. to abolish the sentence. For 
example, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed deep concern 
of the racial disproportionality of JLWOP sentences and reiterated that the U.S. prohibit and 
abolish the sentence.157 This recommendation in particular allows advocates to highlight both the 
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racial disproportionality of JLWOP and how continuing to impose the sentence would violate U.S. 
treaty obligations. 
 While this research identified the various arguments made at the state-level and conducted 
a deeper examination into how the states have abolished juvenile life without parole, the level of 
analysis was limited in its scope. The limitations were due to the absence of information or lack of 
documentation for a number of states as well as its failure to determine why certain arguments 
were not made as frequently as others. For example, the racial disparities in sentencing, despite 
staggering statistics confirming the disproportionality, was not made as often as the researcher 
initially anticipated. Further examination into why this may have been the case is necessary. 
Nevertheless, the results of this research may provide juvenile justice advocates with useful 
information on how to effectively frame the various arguments made to support the elimination of 
juvenile life without parole sentences. The examination of how certain arguments have played out 
in states that have successfully abolished the sentence may add a layer of complexity that helps 
human rights activists understand how to enhance the effectiveness of their advocacy.  
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VII. Appendix 1: States that have abolished juvenile life without parole since Miller v. 
Alabama (2012) 
Mode of reform: litigation 
State Year Case/court Court decision 
Iowa 2016 State v. Sweet 
Iowa Supreme 
Court 
JLWOP violates the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment clause of article I, section 
17 of the Iowa Constitution. 








Both mandatory and discretionary JLWOP 
sentences violate the prohibition of cruel or 
unusual punishment clause of article 26 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 





JLWOP violates the prohibition against cruel 
punishment clause of article I, section 14 of the 
Washington Constitution. 
Mode of reform: legislation 
State Year Bill Effect Vote margin158 
Arkansas 2017 SB 294 Eliminates JLWOP 
-Capital murder or treason: 
parole eligibility after 30 
years 
-Murder in the first degree: 
parole eligibility after 25 
years 
-Non-capital criminal 
offense: parole eligibility 
after 20 years 
House: 86 yeas, 1 
nay 










-Parole eligibility during 
25th year of incarceration 
Senate: 28 yeas, 9 
nays 
Assembly: 44 
yeas, 30 nays 
 
Colorado 2016 SB 16-181 Retroactively eliminates 
JLWOP 
-First-degree murder: 30-50 
years’ imprisonment, parole 
eligibility after 40 years 
Senate: 33 yeas, 2 
nays 
House: 43 yeas, 
22 nays 
                                           




felony: life imprisonment, 
parole eligibility after 40 
years 
Connecticut 2015 SB 796 Eliminates JLWOP 
-Less than 50 years 
sentence: parole eligibility 
after 60% of sentence or 12 
years, whichever is longer 
-More than 50 years 
sentence: parole eligibility 
after 30 years 
Senate: 32 yeas, 3 
nays 
House: 135 yeas, 
11 nays 
Delaware 2013 SB 9 Eliminates JLWOP 
-First-degree murder: 25 
years to life, petition for 
sentence modification after 
30 years 
-20 years imprisonment, 
not first-degree murder: 
petition for sentence 
modification after 20 years  
Senate: 19 yeas, 1 
nay 








possible after 20 years 
Council: 13 yeas, 
0 nays 
Hawaii 2014 H.B. 2116 Eliminates JLWOP  
-First-degree murder or 
attempted murder: life with 
the possibility of parole 
Senate: 25 yeas, 0 
nays 
House: N/A 
Nevada 2015 AB 267 Eliminates JLWOP 
-Non-homicide crimes: 
parole eligibility after 15 
years 
-Homicide crimes: parole 
eligibility after 20 years 
Assembly: 42 
yeas, 0 nays 
Senate 21 yeas, 0 
nays 
 
New Jersey 2017 A 373 Eliminates JLWOP 
-Murder: 30 years 
incarceration without 
parole or 30 years to life 
imprisonment with parole 
eligibility after 30 years 




yeas, 0 nays 
North Dakota 2017 HB 1195 Eliminates JLWOP 
-Sentence reduction 
possible after 20 years 
Senate: 46 yeas, 0 
nays 
House: 87 yeas, 0 
nays 
South Dakota 2016 SB 140 Eliminates JLWOP 
-Class A, B, C felony: 




maximum sentence for a 
term of years 
House: 50 yeas, 
17 nays 
Texas 2013 SB 2  Eliminates JLWOP 
-Capital felony: mandatory 
life sentence with parole 
eligibility after 40 years 
Senate: 87 yeas, 
44 nays 
House: 113 yeas, 
23 nays 
 
Utah 2016 HB 405 Eliminates JLWOP 
-Capital crime: not less 
than 25 years to life with 
parole 
Senate: 23 yeas, 0 
nays 
House: 64 yeas, 3 
nays 
Vermont 2015 H 62 Eliminates JLWOP Senate: 24 yeas, 6 
nays 
House: N/A 
West Virginia 2014 HB 4210 Eliminates JLWOP 
-Parole eligibility after 15 
years 
House: 89 yeas, 9 
nays 
Senate: 34 yeas, 0 
nays 
Wyoming 2013 HB 23  Eliminates JLWOP 
-Parole eligibility after 
commutation of his 
sentence to a term of years 
or after 25 years 
Senate: 30 yeas, 0 
nays 
House: 42 yeas, 
17 nays 
 
